questions of the sort that any referee/reviewer for a professional journal would raise about their paper The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism. Their paper's aim is to examine the empirical basis for "the long-standing claim that activist interventions are followed by declines in longterm operating performance"
social phenomena. We were, in short, empirical positivists who, like Bebchuk et al, asserted the superiority of statistical evidence and quantitative analysis over experience-based empirical knowledge and derided the "self-reported impressions of business leaders".
After running hundreds, if not thousands, of multivariate analyses since my days at MIT, having taught for years doctoral seminars on multivariate analysis, I (Allaire) grew increasingly doubtful that the tool kit of multivariate analysis always provided a superior grasp of complex social phenomena.
The ease of use and the power of computer algorithms produced a surfeit of papers with exaggerated claims, which did not withstand the scrutiny of expert analysis or the passage of time.
Too often, today's study and results are contradicted by tomorrow's study. Results vary and swing in significance as a consequence of slight changes in the definition of sample and variables, in the structure of equations, in included/omitted variables, in ways of dealing with several statistical pathologies, and so on.
For instance and for the benefit of readers who are not specialists in esoteric statistical analysis, let's examine briefly the issue of what causes deadly car accidents.
Several dozen statistical studies have been carried out to establish the correlates of deadly car accidents. Some find that speed limits do not have any statistically significant impact, other studies actually do; some find that seat-belt laws have an impact, others don't; generally, studies agree on the negative role of alcohol consumption but in some studies, this variable is just barely significant; age of driver is sometimes a significant factor, sometimes not; sex of driver also; even use of cell phones while driving is sometimes a significant factor, in other studies, it is not.
To try to fully account for the multiple factors, some studies include up to 50 variables (time of accident, weather conditions, lighting conditions, road conditions, etc. The study reviewed here appears in the first column; the next two columns report on studies using the very same database. The other columns are drawn from studies where researchers adopted different definitions of what constitute an "activist" hedge fund intervention. Obviously, for the very same years, the number of observations varies widely. Which study uses the appropriate definition of hedge fund "intervention"?
In a recent study by Becht et al. (2014) Greenwood and Schor (2008) and Brav et al. (2008) for the U.S., covering the periods 1994-2006 and 2001-2006, respectively Tables 2 and 3" Then, let's examine the statistical analysis  The number of observations for the purpose of their regression analyses is staggering, well over 120,000! With 2,000 interventions and 9 years, one would get at the very most 18,000 observations (actually far fewer because of missing data and shrinkage of all sorts already noted). How do the authors, without a word of explanation, arrive at this number of observations? Is it possible that the regression analysis is carried out on monthly data? But as ROA and Tobin's Q are available, at best, on a quarterly basis (a datum highly sensitive to seasonality), it would mean that the regression is carried out where 80,000 times the dependent variables (ROA or Tobin's Q) would in fact be repetition of the other 40,000 observations. That seems far-fetched but how else can these numbers of observations be explained? We are still waiting for an explanation from Bebchuk et al.
 In their regression analysis, the authors use the natural logarithm of the age of the firm as control variable. In the literature, this variable is frequently used; the well-known relationship is that as firms grow older, the ROA tends to decrease. But in the Bebchuk et al study the coefficient of Ln (age) is positive and statistically significant on all the regressions using ROA as dependent variable and yet negative and significant when Tobin's Q is the dependent variable. The authors give no explanation for this surprising result, which may be an indication that the ROA regressions suffer from a common, but serious, econometric problem called "multicollinearity", making the interpretation and significance of all regression coefficients subject to great caution.
 The adjustment for "industry peers", a common practice in econometric studies, brings up a host of problems rarely, if ever, mentioned in these econometric studies: in many instances, the "peers" are not really comparable companies; companies often operate in several 3-digit SIC classification; newer types of companies are difficult to classify in this old classification (e.g. Google, Facebook, etc.). Indeed, since 1997, a new system, the North American industrial classification system (NAICS), has been developed to replace SIC codes; "NAICS codes provide a greater level of detail about a firm's activity than SIC codes…There are 358 new industries recognized in NAICS, 250 of which are services producing industries. Additionally, NAICS codes are based on a consistent, economic concept, while SIC codes are not". Canada has shifted totally to the NAICS while the U.S. is doing so gradually.
 Regardless of the limitations of the SIC classification, we believe the authors should have provided descriptive statistics showing the number of interventions by industry, the size of targeted firms compared to industry peers. However, subsequent tables for 2,624 hedge fund "interventions" between 1994 and 2011 (Brav, June 2014; Brav, Jiang, and Kim, September 2013) show that  the median market value of targeted companies was $134.6 million and on average $835.3 million;
 a so-called group of "matched firms" had average market value of $2.741 billion, a very significant difference with targeted firms!  the median original investment by hedge funds was $13.5 million; in only the top 5% (or some 130 targeted firms) did the hedge fund investment reach a median value of $185.1 million; it appears that the Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang study is heavily weighted with small companies and relatively small investments by hedge funds. Do the results published by Bebchuk et al hold for larger targeted companies?
 the median duration of hedge fund intervention was 348 days, but for hostile interventions, that median duration was 179 days; the authors consider that these hedge funds are therefore not short-term investors. It is a strange financial world where investments for one year or so qualify as long-term.
We have raised several other questions in our paper which have remained unanswered but the above suffices to show that answers to critical questions must come forth before the validity of the claims made by Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang is established.
Bebchuk concluded his note on our paper by stating: Most research in financial economics in recent years would conclude that the significant ROA improvement from year t-1 to year t+2 is indicative of a positive effect of the activist intervention. All other indicators are barely mentioned. Of course, what we shall never know is whether the boards of directors and management, observing a decreasing ROA, would have taken actions to correct the situation without any "activist hedge fund" to hold their hand.
In any case, the assessment of hedge fund activism must factor in a broader array of outcomes as well as their impact on other stakeholders. Some studies have documented their impact on bondholders and employees (e.g. Klein and Zur, 2011; Xu and Li, 2010, Aslan and Maraachlian, 2009; Brav et al., 2008) -but even when there is a clear evidence of "expropriation effect", activism is still qualified as "positive" as long as return to shareholders increases or some performance ratio improves.
Some activist interventions might help create some real enduring value (and not just wealth transfer). What are those interventions? What is the context surrounding those events? What are the characteristics of useful interventions? Are there ways to encourage interventions that do contribute to better governance and discourage "interventions" that will only harm companies?
The paper by Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang, warts and all, has launched a useful debate about the pros and cons of hedge fund activism but their study cannot be considered the definitive answer but merely an opening salvo.
